Second Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Geneva, 25 July, 2024

Statement by Canada – Cluster 1 Issues

Delivered by Mr. Daniel Barbarie

Deputy Director, Non-proliferation, Disarmament and Space Division, 抖淫视频

Chair,

I begin by reaffirming Canada’s steadfast and longstanding support for the NPT and the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

At the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, Canada’s Prime Minister highlighted four measures to deprive “the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds”:

1. a comprehensive nuclear test ban;
2. an agreement to stop flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles;
3. an agreement to prohibit all production of fissile material for weapons purposes; and,
4. an agreement to limit and progressively reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems.

Now, some of these measures may seem very familiar.

I mention them not out of nostalgia but to highlight their ongoing relevance, and our limited progress over the past fifty years.

Let us recall that Article 6 of the NPT commits Parties to undertake and pursue negotiations in good faith to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament.

Good faith is the standard by which we measure a State’s commitment to honour its promises, without evasion or equivocation.

Few principles are as vital to treaty law and multilateral behaviour.

In our view, a good faith interpretation of Article 6 demands that the nuclear-weapon States fulfil their special responsibility to engage in genuine and concerted efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

With this in mind, let’s take stock of the aforementioned measures intended to curb the nuclear arms race.

First, on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, we've made great strides, with near-universal support and a strong global norm against testing.

Yet, close on 30 years, progress has stalled.

We urge the nine outstanding Annex II States to promptly ratify the Treaty.

Second, on new strategic delivery vehicles, nuclear-armed states continue to devote significant resources to developing new systems.

North Korea's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs, in violation of Security Council resolutions, are a clear example.

Third, is our failure to begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. 

Those that possess or produce fissile material for nuclear weapons must demonstrate political will, engage in transparency and confidence-building measures amongst themselves, put aside pre-conditions, and come to the negotiation table.

And, fourth, how do we reconcile commitments to nuclear disarmament and to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in policies and doctrines with increasing global spending on nuclear weapons?

Some may argue that as a NATO ally, Canada cannot support both nuclear deterrence and disarmament.

This is inaccurate.

Our NATO commitment to deterrence for our collective security neither prevents us, nor discourages us, from simultaneously pursuing reciprocal, verifiable, step-by-step disarmament.

Canada’s commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world is steadfast.

To conclude, Canada endorses the recommendations of the VG-10 and NPDI and invites all states to support the Stockholm Initiative's "Stepping Up" paper.

Stepping up isn’t just about more effort.

It demands leadership and decisive action.

Though the nuclear-weapon States may be bound by the same NPT obligations, they are not a monolith.

We applaud those that have taken steps to prioritize dialogue, transparency, and cooperation, and call on those that have not, to follow suit.

To fully realize Article 6, however, all nuclear-weapon States must step up.

We are often told, “these things take time”, or “now is not the right time”.

These arguments are no longer enough.

Because, as our Prime Minister argued almost fifty years ago at SSOD-1,

“It is important not to mistake the shadow for the substance. Declarations of good intent are no substitute for real disarmament.’’

Good faith requires more than declarations; it demands tangible, verifiable actions, transparency, accountability, and mutual trust.

Let us engage constructively, guided by the enduring principle of good faith, towards a nuclear-weapon free world.