Second Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Geneva, 26 July, 2024

Statement by Canada – Cluster 2 Issues

Delivered by Mr. Shawn Friele, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Canada to the International Organizations in Vienna

Chair,

The non-proliferation regime is coming under increasing strain from instances of non-compliance with safeguards obligations.

The requirement for all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT to conclude and fully implement safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is central to our shared objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Instances of non-compliance and refusals to fully address safeguards concerns undermine confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of States’ nuclear activities, which is crucial to ensuring all states’ access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology.

Canada maintains that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) along with an Additional Protocol (AP) form the de facto verification standard pursuant to Article III of the NPT.

Only the CSA and AP together provide the IAEA with the required tools to fully verify the correctness and completeness of States’ nuclear declarations and allow the Agency to conclude that all nuclear material remains in peaceful activities.

We urge all States that have not yet done so to bring into force a CSA and AP without delay.

We note with concern that the IAEA will no longer be able to draw safeguards conclusions for States with a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) based on the original text.

We call on all States with SQPs based on the original standard text to rescind or amend these instruments as soon as possible.

Canada maintains its steadfast support for the IAEA and its essential verification role.

Notably, we welcome the Agency’s continued work with implicated parties to develop appropriate safeguards approaches for nuclear naval propulsion programmes as envisioned within the existing legal framework.

Canada also welcomes the IAEA’s continued implementation of the State-Level Concept as a means of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards.

We commend the Agency’s ability to adapt verification approaches to address evolving circumstances and encourage all States to integrate safeguards-by-design principles into new nuclear facilities.

While the safeguards system remains robust, Canada shares the concerns of many delegations regarding the challenges posed by ongoing cases of non-compliance with NPT obligations.

Iran’s persistent unwillingness to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve outstanding safeguards issues remains deeply concerning.

Iran has repeatedly failed to provide credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at previously undeclared locations and is not implementing legal obligations under Modified Code 3.1 of its CSA.

Canada reiterates its call for Iran to step back from its nuclear escalations and to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding questions relating to its nuclear programme.

Syria’s long-standing failure to comply with its safeguards obligations must be immediately addressed.

Canada continues to call on Syria to adhere to its NPT commitments and to fully cooperate with the IAEA to resolve outstanding safeguards questions.

Canada remains deeply concerned by North Korea’s continued violations of UN Security Council resolutions through the development of its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs.

Canada condemns in the strongest terms North Korea’s provocations which continue to pose a grave threat to international peace and security.

Canada maintains its strong support for the establishment of a verifiable Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East but notes that efforts towards this establishment must address the serious issues of non-compliance present in the region.

Finally, it is crucial that this Conference remain seized of the serious risks which Russia’s illegal and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine pose to nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implementation.

Canada remains firm in our calls on the Russian Federation to immediately cease all actions against Ukrainian nuclear facilities and return the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to the control of the competent Ukrainian authorities in line with relevant IAEA Board and General Conference resolutions.

The non-proliferation regime faces unprecedented and complex threats.

In these challenging times, Canada remains unwavering in our support for the NPT and the IAEA’s essential verification role as the foundational blocks to the institutional architecture preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.